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REX J. ZEDALIS*
New Export Controls for
Chemicals on the Horizon?
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention) of January 13,
1993,' signed by over 150 nations, including the United States, Russia, the Euro-
pean nations, and Japan, 2 sets its sights on prohibiting the development, produc-
tion, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons; 3 the destruction of such weapons
and facilities for their production; 4 obligatory disclosure regarding chemical
weapons and facilities producing such weapons;5 and inspections designed to
verify compliance with the strictures of the Convention.6 The CWC builds upon
the Geneva Protocol of 1925,7 which prohibits combat use of chemical or biologi-
cal weapons, but not their production or storage,' and the Biological Weapons
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article in any not-for-
profit publication or handout provided such reproduction acknowledges original publication in this
issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the author.
*Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of Tulsa;
J.S.D. (1987) and Cutting Fellow in International Law (1980-81), Columbia University; Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission (1977-78); International Law Division,
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture (1978-80).
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, January 13, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993)
[hereinafter CWC]. For discussion concerning the Convention, see Chemical Weapons Convention
(Treaty Doc. 103-21): Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
2. Conspicuously absent, however, are Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, among others.
See Legislative Summary: Chemical Weapons Convention, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3191 (1994).
3. CWC, supra note 1, art. I(1).
4. Id. arts. I(2)-(4), IV-V, & Annex on Implementation and Verification (Verification Annex),
pts. IV(A), (B), & V.
5. Id. art. III.
6. Id. arts. IV-VI, IX, & Verification Annex.
7. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 573, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
8. This prohibition led many nations, including the United States, which ultimately became a
state party in 1975, to take reservations preserving the right to use such weapons in retaliation. See
Elizabeth Palmer, For Business, a High Price for Chemical Weapons Ban, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2584 (1994).
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Convention of 1972, 9 which addresses development, production, stockpiling,
and destruction of biological and toxin weapons, but not verification.' ° Those
interested in the laws of war" will have an obvious interest in the CWC. 2 The
focus of attention in this article, however, is on the effect the Convention is likely
to have on businesses involved in exporting chemicals to foreign entities. 13
Given that the principal motivation for the Convention was the elimination of the
availability of chemicals for use during conflict situations, its relevance to export
businesses not involved in dealing in weaponry and armaments may seem strange. 14
Yet as an example of the wide scope of the CWC's provisions, a notice of the devel-
opment of regulations, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau
of Export Administration, indicated that thiodiglycol, a solvent used in the manu-
facture of ball point pens, is a chemical the Convention controls.' 5 In the United
States alone, the chemical industry numbers upwards of 12,000 facilities em-
9. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, T.I.A.S. No.
8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
10. The Biological Weapons Convention entered into force on March 26, 1975, and the United
States is a party thereto. For a brief description of the Biological Weapons Convention's place in
the development of the Chemical Weapons Convention, see Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 312, 323-24 (1994) (reprinting
an excerpt from a report by Acting Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff accompanying President Clinton's
letter transmitting the CWC to the Senate for advice and consent).
11. On certain aspects of the laws of land warfare involved in the Gulf War, see Rex J. Zedalis,
Military Necessity and Iraqi Destruction of Kuwaiti Oil, 23 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
333 (1990); Rex J. Zedalis, Gulf War Compensation Standard: Concerns Under the Charter, 26
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 333 (1993).
12. For some literature dealing with the CWC, see THOMAS BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMA-
MENT (1990); SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICALWARFARE STUDIES No. 11, NATIONAL IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE FUTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (Thomas Stock & Donald Sutherland eds.,
1990); Richard Luce, Chemical Weapons: Negotiating a Total Ban, NATO REV., June 1985, at 8.
13. On exports being tied to chemical weapons production in the past, see Robert J. McCartney,
Bonn Names 4 More Firms Linked by U.S. to Libya, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1989, at A16; John J.
Eialka, Western Industry Sells Third World the Means to Produce Poison Gas, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Sees Gains in Effort to Stop West German Aid to
Libya Chemical Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1989, at A5; R. Jeffrey Smith, CIA Cites European
Role in More Gas-Weapon Sites; Syrian, Iranian Chemical Plants Noted, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1989,
at A24. American businesses have another reason to be interested in the Convention: the on-site
inspection provisions. Stated succinctly, the CWC provisions require each party to make sure all
locations are held open to international inspections to assure compliance with the prohibitions of the
CWC. See generally David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on
Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229 (1988).
14. Indeed, both Michael Moodie, president, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, and
Don Mahley, Acting Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, reportedly have found the American business community to react with disinterest. Appar-
ently, the business community has assumed that the Convention does not concern businesses involved
in fields other than weapons production. See Palmer, supra note 8, at 2587.
15. Notice of the Development of Regulations to Implement U.S. Industry Obligations Under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,291, 66,292 (1994).
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ploying nearly 900,000 individuals. 1 6 The industry's direct interest in the CWC is
apparent from the fact that chemicals represent the United States' single largest
export sector, producing approximately $43 billion in export revenues during
1993.'7 To the extent that the Convention purports to restrain exports of chemicals,
its potential impact on enterprises in that sector is not simply speculative. 8 While
it is true that, if one focuses on the United States, exports by chemical businesses
are currently regulated under the terms of the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR),' 9 the CWC imposes restraints where the EAR may not. Specifically, highly
toxic chemicals under the EAR's most stringent control-the validated license-
may be exportable for end uses not tolerated by the restraints imposed by the
CWC.20 The same or similar kind of situation may exist in other signatories as well.
Let us now turn our attention to those aspects of the Convention relating to exports
and examine the precise dimensions of its reach.2'
16. Id. Other estimates have placed the number of facilities at 20,000. See Palmer, supra note
8, at 2586 (citing 1991 data from the Office of Technology Assessment).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK ch. 11 (1), SIC 28 (35th
ed. 1994).
18. Apart from export restraints, the verification measures prescribed by the CWC and alluded
to supra in note 13 present an additional set of obligations to which the chemical industry, and others,
even though not engaged in export business, must attend.
19. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.1-. 15 (1995). These regulations implement the Export Administration
Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988). (The Act expired on August 20, 1994, and as of the writing
of this article [Spring 1995], Congress has not adopted a new version. The regulations have been
continued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1988)). Additionally, the Department of State's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-.29 (1993), govern exports of chemicals with military applications. For an
illustrative enumeration of such chemicals, see id. § 121.7 (Munitions List).
20. Under the CWC, so-called Schedule 1 chemicals and precursors, those with high potential
for use in prohibited activities (see the "Guidelines for Schedules of Chemicals" in the CWC, supra
note 1, Annex on Chemicals (A)) can be transferred to parties to the Convention only for protective,
research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes (id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(A)). Nothing in the
Export Administration Act or the EAR would prevent the transfer of such chemicals, even though
under validated license, for other peaceful purposes, including industrial or agricultural uses, in the
event such uses exist. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 778.8, 799.1 (ECCN IC, 60C), 799.2, Interpretation 23
(1995). Though as a factual matter the Department of State, pursuant to the provisions of the ITAR,
may refuse to authorize exports of such chemicals for peaceful purposes not considered research,
medical, or pharmaceutical, nothing in the controlling regulations, unlike in the CWC, requires that
approach.
21. With regard to the range of chemicals affected by the Convention, the following specifically
named chemicals are mentioned in the CWC, supra note 1, Annex on Chemicals. Some of these
more common uses of the chemicals are identified in order to give the reader an indication of the
CWC's breadth of coverage.
CHEMICALS USES
Amiton miticide/insecticide
Arsenic trichloriode production of ceramics
Phosgene preparation of organic chemicals; polymers
Cyanogen chloride chemical synthesis
Sulfur monochloride cold vulcanization of rubber; production of vegetable oils
Triethanolamine in manufacture of polishes, waxes, toilet goods, cement,
dyes
Hydrogen cyanide rodenticides; forestry
SPRING 1996
144 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
I. Structure of the Convention's Export Controls
The CWC's complexity and breadth can be simplified in the area of export
controls to four basic concepts. First, as provided in article I, all transfers of
chemical weapons are prohibited. 2  This prohibition includes not only transfers
of munitions and devices designed to inflict injury through the release of toxic
chemicals,23 and equipment used in connection with employing such munitions
and devices,2 4 but prohibits transfers of toxic chemicals and their precursors as
well. 25 The CWC defines toxic chemicals and their precursors as all chemicals,
regardless of where they originate or are produced, that cause at least temporary
26incapacitation to humans or animals through chemical action on life processes,
and all chemical reactants that take part in the production of toxic chemicals.
27
Second, the CWC permits toxic chemicals and their precursors (but not toxic
munitions and devices, or equipment used in connection with them) to be trans-
ferred whenever intended for "purposes not prohibited under the Convention.,
21
Article II, paragraph 1(a) structures the definition of chemical weapons so as to
exclude from coverage under the prohibition of article I toxic chemicals and their
precursors transferred for nonprohibited purposes. The language of articles VI,
X, and XI solidify this permission. Article VI provides that each party has a
right, subject to the CWC, to make transfers for purposes not prohibited by the
Convention. 29 Article X declares that nothing in the Convention impedes the right
of each party to transfer, for nonprohibited purposes, means of protection against
chemical weapons.3 ° And article XI states that the CWC shall not be implemented
in a way that hampers economic or technological development, or international
cooperation, in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited by the
Convention.31
Third, in view of the definition of "purposes not prohibited by the Convention"
contained in article II, paragraph 9, transfers of toxic chemicals and their precur-
sors for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other
22. Id. art. 1, para. 1 reads, in part, "[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes never
under any circumstances: (a) To ... acquire ... or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons
to anyone." Art. VII then obligates parties to adopt implementing legislation prohibiting businesses
or individuals from undertaking activities prohibited to parties. Id. art. VII, para. 1.
23. Id. art. II, para. 1(b).
24. Id. para. 1(c).
25. Id. para. 1(a).
26. Id. para. 2. Herbicides are not covered by the Convention. However, it has been said they
would be covered if they are used in such a way as to transform their toxic effect into something
intentionally directed at humans or animals. See WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 25, 30, 31 (1994) [hereinafter A COMMENTARY].
27. CWC, supra note 1, art. II, para. 3.
28. Id. paras. 2, 3.
29. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
30. Id. art. X, para. 2.
31. Id. art. XI, paras. 1, 2(c). On the compromise, yet flawed, nature of this provision, see A
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 215-17.
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peaceful purposes3 2 appear to fall outside the prohibition of article I" In every
case, however, the types and quantities of items transferred must be consistent
with the purposes concerned. 34 That is to say, one could not cite the concept of
nonprohibited purposes as authorizing transfer of a toxic chemical if the chemical
were one that had no actual use in industry, agriculture, research, medicine,
pharmacology, or some other peaceful activity. Nor could one rely on that concept
to rationalize the transfer of an incredibly large volume of a toxic chemical if a
much smaller quantity would be more than sufficient to meet needs associated
with the permitted purposes.
Fourth, even though the CWC permits transfers of toxic chemicals and their
precursors for industrial and agricultural use, and peaceful purposes generally,
it makes a distinction between transfers to other parties to the Convention and
transfers to states that have not agreed to the Convention's terms. The CWC
also attaches specific conditions to otherwise permitted transfers. In regard to
permitted transfers, article XVII makes the CWC's annexes, including that on
verification, as much a part of the Convention's terms as its twenty-four articles.35
Parts VI-VIII of the Verification Annex then set out a transfer scheme that affects
parties and nonparties differently, and imposes particular conditions on generally
permitted transfers of toxic chemicals and their precursors.36 The idea is to restrict
transfers made to nonparties and impose conditions on permitted transfers to
parties or nonparties.
II. General Concerns in Exports by Private Entities
By its very terms, the CWC applies to all states that are party to its provisions .3
It is not cast in language suggesting that private entities, business or otherwise,
have certain obligations to restrict their conduct in any particular way.3" Article
32. CWC, supra note 1, art. I, para. 9(a). Also included are so-called "[p]rotective purposes"
and "[m]ilitary purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons." Id. art. II, para. 9(b),
(c).
33. The reference to transfers for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or
other peaceful purposes appearing to fall beyond the gambit of art. I's prohibition is deliberate. As
will become apparent below, the purposes for which the chemicals of most concern, those listed in
Schedule 1 of the Verification Annex, may be transferred are even more limited than the purposes
set forth in the definition of nonprohibited purposes.
34. This limitation arises out of the fact that the exception from the definition of chemical weapons
in art. I, para. 1(a), of toxic chemicals and their precursors intended for purposes not prohibited
under the CWC, links such chemicals and precursors to types and quantities consistent with the
nonprohibited purposes upon which reliance is placed.
35. Id. art. XVII.
36. See id., Verification Annex.
37. The provisions that establish obligations are not just those found in the 24 articles of the
Convention. By virtue of art. XVII, the provisions of the three annexes also establish obligations
that must be fulfilled. Id. art. XVII.
38. For instance, the basic prohibition of the Convention, contained in art. I, states "Each State
Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances . . . [t]o develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
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VII, however, assures that the basic prohibition on transfers will serve to restrain
the conduct of natural and legal persons, by virtue of requiring each party to
the Convention to adopt internal domestic measures extending the Convention's
obligations to such persons.39 The Convention in effect imposes direct restrictions
on transfers by any branch or agency of the governmental authority adhering to
its terms, as well as indirect restrictions on natural or legal persons through
adoption of local law implementing the Convention's obligations, in particular
the prohibition on transfers. 40
Apart from questions about the CWC's prohibition on transfers reaching con-
duct by business enterprises, one might wonder whether any inference may be
drawn from the fact the term "transfer" is used in some provisions of the Conven-
tion,4 ' and "export" is used in others.42 Might this usage suggest that, since
article I, which contains the Convention's basic prohibition, and article VI, which
contains its basic permission regarding nonprohibited purposes, use the term
"transfer" they are referring to something other than an "export" transfer? A
couple of pieces of evidence suggest the perverseness of such a reading. Initially,
the instances in which the term "export" appears are few and are confined to
what declarations each state party must make concerning national data on exports
of chemicals. 43 "Transfer," on the other hand, tends to be used in connection
with the basic provisions addressing prohibited and permitted conduct. 44 The
implication is that "export" is a technical term connoting movement across the
weapons to anyone." Id. art. I, para. 1(a). The exception concerning "purposes not prohibited by
the Convention" also speaks of each "State Party" having a right to develop, produce, acquire,
transfer, etc., chemical weapons for such purposes. See id. art. VI, para. 1.
39. Art. VII provides in part:
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the
necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular,
it shall:
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation
with respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention; and
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity pro-
hibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons,
possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law.
40. Id. art. VII, para. 1. While the CWC's use of "State Party" and "natural or legal persons"
indicates that in a federal system the national government (which has obligated itself by signature
and ratification), individuals, businesses, and other legal entities may be obligated to observe the
terms of the Convention, one may wonder about state and local governments. These governments
would seem to fall within the ambit of art. VII, which obligates parties to prohibit conduct "in any
place under [their] control." Id. art. VII, para. l(b). For a discussion of the flip side of whose transfers
are controlled, that is, to whom transfers are controlled, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 1, arts. I, VI, X, XI.
42. See, e.g., id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(A), para. 1, & pt. VIII(A), para. 1.
43. See id.
44. See provisions cited supra note 40.
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borders of a country, while "transfer" is a broader term capable of encompassing
the idea of export.45 Another piece of evidence supports the notion of "transfer"
having a broader meaning, and the view that it is wrong to conclude the use of
"transfer," in conjunction with "export," suggests the prohibition of article I
and the permission of article VI do not concern the movement of chemicals from
one country to another. Specifically, various provisions exist in the Convention
that clearly use the term "transfer" to refer to the movement of chemicals across
international borders. Most significant in this respect are the provisions dealing
with chemicals the parties consider of the greatest concern, the scheduled chemi-
cals. In all such cases, the language speaks of a state party making a transfer
"outside its territory," 6 or "to... States Parties,"-47 or "to States not Party
to this Convention.,
48
The other general concern that merits attention in the context of exports by
business enterprises of toxic chemicals and their precursors involves the ability
of such entities to avail themselves of article VI's permission regarding exports for
purposes not prohibited by the CWC, including industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes. 49 Admittedly, no language
is present in article VII, or elsewhere, providing that the Convention's permission
can be exercised by natural or legal persons. In speaking to the requirement that
parties adopt domestic legislation implementing their obligations, article VII, as
noted above, 50 focuses on ensuring that states extend to other actors the prohibi-
tions imposed by the CWC. Not a word appears about any permission being so
extended. Even article VI, and the other provisions addressing the departure for
nonprohibited purposes, happen to be in terms referencing only sovereign states.51
Nonetheless, given that the CWC's prohibitions relate, among other things, to
chemical weapons, and chemical weapons are defined as excluding toxic chemi-
cals and their precursors intended for nonprohibited purposes, article VII does
not seem to require the adoption of domestic legislation allowing only states and
their official organs the right to make transfers for such purposes. 52 As a general
45. Indeed, given the use of the term "transfer," one would find it impossible to argue that the
Convention does not control situations where possession of toxic chemicals or their precursors passes
within the borders of a state party, with the recipient then seeking to remove them from the country
under the justification that the CWC regulates exports, and exports involve one entity in possession
of an item sending it outside the borders of the nation to another who then takes up possession.
Apart from this being a strained interpretation of the notion of export, utilization of the term "transfer"
neutralizes all such arguments, supporting the idea of transfer encompassing many types of transac-
tions, including exports. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 13-14.
46. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 1.
47. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 31.
48. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VIII(C), para. 26.
49. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 1, art. VI, pars. 1 & art. X, para. 2.
52. The Convention leaves open the possibility that such authority may be exercised by a state
party possessing the internal constitutional power to prohibit natural and legal persons from exporting
toxic chemicals and their precursors for nonprohibited purposes.
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matter, natural and legal persons should be viewed as having fixed upon them
the same obligations under the Convention as faced by states parties to the Conven-
tion. Also, as the character of those obligations happens to be affected by the
permission contained in article VI, the obligations are as capable of changing
their appearance for natural and legal persons as they are as for states.
Ill. Exports by Businesses Based in States Parties
The prohibitions of the CWC, and in particular the prohibition regarding ex-
ports, clearly apply to business enterprises and private persons.53 Further, the
permission to export for purposes of a nonprohibited nature, like industrial,
agricultural, or medical use, does not apply only to government entities 4 Thus,
no doubt exists that the CWC provides for controls over exports of toxic chemicals
and their precursors by business enterprises based in states parties. This section
now examines the precise nature of these controls in connection with business
exports from an adherent to the Convention. The focus is on exports of controlled
chemicals produced in the adhering country, not on reexports of chemicals origi-
nally imported from elsewhere.55
Business enterprises based in a state party may be purely local,56 or they may
be extensions of enterprises located in another country. 7 If one were to use the
concept of affiliate to refer to all forms of enterprises based in a party yet owned
by an enterprise situated in another country, one might employ the notion of a
domestic affiliate of a foreign business. By this standard, a free-standing, wholly
local enterprise might be termed simply a domestic business. But whether con-
cerned with a domestic affiliate of a foreign business, or with a domestic business
alone, the CWC appears to make no distinction with regard to exports from a
party to the Convention. If an affiliate of a foreign enterprise organizes under
the laws of, or does business within, a state party, it can be said to be "on its
[(i.e., the state party's)] territory" 58 and therefore subject to legislation the party
must adopt to implement its obligation prohibiting exports.5 9 This approach con-
53. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
55. For discussion of the reexport problem, see infra part V.
56. "Local" means an enterprise indigenous to the state party concerned. The enterprise is not
under the ownership of another entity located in a foreign nation.
57. Here the enterprise in the state party is under the ownership of an entity located in a foreign
nation.
58. CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1(a); see also A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 112-13
(indicating coverage of "companies and corporations organized under the law of the State Party
itself, of another State Party or of a State not Party to the Convention" when such are within the
territory of a state party).
59. Whether the CWC also provides for the foreign nation serving as the home of the enterprise
owning the affiliate to exercise control is a matter taken up below, see infra part IV.
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firms territoriality as a basis of jurisdiction recognized by international law. 60
Moreover, it also guarantees that businesses located in nations not bound by the
terms of the CWC cannot obtain transfers from affiliates established in states
parties to the Convention. Not only are wholly domestic enterprises based in a
state party subject to the general prohibition on transfers, so are foreign-held
domestic affiliates, given their location in such a party's territory.
Implementing legislation may permit domestic affiliates and free-standing do-
mestic enterprises to depart from the basic prohibition on transfers when such trans-
fers are for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. 61 Again, this measure would
appear to include exports of toxic chemicals and their precursors for industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes. In
such cases, however, exporters must comply with the provisions of the Convention
distinguishing between transfers to parties and those to nonparties, and with the
provisions imposing limitations on permitted transfers generally. 62 This require-
ment means exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to countries not party to the CWC are
prohibited. 63 Additionally, exports to state parties, though permitted, must be for
research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for industrial, agricultural,
or other peaceful purposes. 64 Further, transfers destined for countries party to the
Convention must also be strictly limited to the types and quantities justified by the
permitted purposes; 65 must not exceed one ton in any given year; 66 must not be
retransferred to a third state; 67 require thirty days' advance notice to the Technical
Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the
Hague; 68 and must be followed by an annual declaration detailing all Schedule 1
transfers, including information on the recipient of each transfer and the purpose
involved.69
Schedules 2 and 3 chemicals, those with a lesser degree of military usefulness
and a greater amount of commercial application, do not fall under the same highly
restrictive regime. Implementing legislation adopted by a state party to carry out
obligations with regard to the export of such chemicals by business enterprises can
be more liberal. With respect to Schedule 2 chemicals, the CWC permits transfers
60. See Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.
1983).
61. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
63. See CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 1.
64. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 2(a); see A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 418
(limited purposes of permitted transfer). Observe that para. 2(a) references "protective purposes"
as well. These purposes come within the general definition of "purposes not prohibited by the
Convention" in art. H. CWC, supra note 1, art. II, para. 9.
65. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 2(b).
66. Id. para. 2(c)-(d).
67. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VI(B), para. 4.
68. Id. para. 5.
69. Id. para. 6.
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to nonparties during an interim period to run for three years after the Convention
enters into force. 7 It does this by permitting only transfers to states parties, and
then providing that this obligation commences three years after the CWC becomes
effective. Obviously, given the Convention's basic prohibition on the transfer of
71
chemical weapons, including the transfer of toxic chemicals and their precursors,
allowing the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals to states parties implies that the trans-
fer has to be for a nonprohibited purpose. Indeed, during the three-year interim
period following the entry into force of the Convention, shipments destined for
states not party to the CWC require a certificate from the recipient declaring that
the chemicals will only be used for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.72
This requirement corroborates the idea that, in order to be permitted, a transfer to
anyone, whether state party or not, must be for a nonprohibited purpose.73 The
certificate must also indicate that the chemicals will not be retransferred,74 the types
and quantities involved,75 the end use,76 and the identity of the end user. 7' The pur-
poses for which exports of Schedule 2 chemicals may be made include industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes.
These purposes are more inclusive than the research, medical, and pharmaceutical
purposes capable of supporting exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to another state
party.78
Schedule 3 chemicals may also be transferred to nonparties as well as parties.7 9
The CWC explicitly subjects transfers to nonparties to the requirement that the
transfers be for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. 80 The language of the
annex attaching this requirement tracks the language of the identical requirement
regarding Schedule 2 chemicals. Therefore, the transfers can involve industrial,
agricultural, and other peaceful purposes, in addition to the research, medical,
and pharmaceutical purposes that limit transfers to states parties of chemicals
70. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 31. According to art. XXII, the Convention enters
into force 180 days after 65 states ratify its provisions.
71. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
72. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 32(a).
73. After all, the requirement of a certification of intended use in connection with transfers to
nonparties during the three-year interim period is simply that. In and of itself it does not dictate
(though it may indicate) that transfers can only be made for nonprohibited purposes. However, given
that art. I prohibits all transfers of toxic chemicals and their precursors, unless for purposes not
prohibited by the Convention, the only way that any transfer would seem authorized is if it were
for a nonprohibited purpose. Thus, whether to a party or a nonparty, transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals
are prohibited, unless for purposes not prohibited, peaceful purposes like industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, or pharmaceutical use.
74. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 32(b).
75. Id. para. 32(c).
76. Id. para. 32(d).
77. Id. para. 32(e).
78. Compare id., Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 2(A), with id., Verification Annex, pt.
VII(C), para. 32(a).
79. See id., Verification Annex, pt. VIII, para. 26.
80. Id. para. 26(a).
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listed in Schedule 1. Again, as with Schedule 2 transfers to states not party to
the CWC, transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals must be supported by a certification
indicating that the chemicals are to be used for nonprohibited purposes; 8' that
they will not be retransferred; 82 their specific type, quantity, and end use;8 3 and
the precise identity of the end user."4 Transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals destined
for states parties must be supported by some nonprohibited purpose, just as with
Schedule 2 chemicals. However, the Convention does not obligate parties to
require certification of the sort involved with transfers going to a state not a party
to the CWC.85
What about exports by businesses of toxic chemicals and their precursors not
listed in the three schedules of chemicals annexed to the Convention? What, if
any, restrictions, requirements, or conditions are imposed on their export? Part
IX of the Verification Annex addresses such unscheduled chemicals. 8 6 The thrust
of Part IX, however, seems to be facilities producing chemicals of that type, not
the establishment of specific obligations relative to the transfer of such. 87 This
approach places reliance upon the general prohibition on exports set forth in
article I, and on the basic permission of article VI, confirmed in the language
of articles X and XI, regarding exports for purposes not prohibited by the Conven-
tion. 88 Essentially, this approach results in exports to parties or nonparties being
permitted as long as the exports are for peaceful purposes, like industrial, agricul-
tural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical use. 89 The definition of "chemical
weapons" contains the only condition: requiring that the types and quantities of
chemicals transferred be consistent with the permitted purposes justifying the
transfer. 90
Somewhat related to the distinction between scheduled and unscheduled toxic
chemicals and their precursors is the matter of to whom the Convention prohibits,
restricts, or conditions exports. 91 This question arises as a result of language that
81. Id.
82. Id. para. 26(b).
83. Id. para. 26(c)-(d).
84. Id. para. 26(e).
85. Nonetheless, according to the terms of the Verification Annex, parties to the CWC must sub-
mit annual declarations concerning exports of Schedules 2 and 3 chemicals. Id., Verification Annex,
pt. VII(A), para. 1, & pt. VIII(A), para. 1. For a similar obligation concerning Schedule 1 chemicals,
see id., Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 6.
86. See id., Verification Annex, pt. IX.
87. Indeed, nothing in part IX of the Verification Annex obligates state parties to make periodic
declarations concerning exports of unscheduled chemicals. As observed above, however, such an
obligation does exist with regard to scheduled chemicals.
88. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
89. Recall that the definition of "Purposes Not Prohibited under this Convention" includes other
noncommercial type uses. See CWC, supra note 1, art. II, para. 9.
90. See id. art. 1I, para. l(a).
91. The Convention unquestionably distinguishes transfers to state parties from transfers to states
not party to its terms. The following text deals with whether any distinction exists between transfers
to governments and transfers to nongovernment entities.
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appears in various provisions of the CWC suggesting the recipients targeted are
states, not natural or legal persons. 92 But not only would it make little sense to
regulate exports to states if businesses and other private entities located there
were left free to receive such, the Convention itself clearly refuses to draw a
differentiation of this character. The terms of article I's basic prohibition on
exports of toxic chemicals explicitly extends to direct or indirect transfers "to
anyone."93 Admittedly, exports for nonprohibited purposes may be undertaken.
Yet, as already seen, the basic language in article I, and in particular its reference
to transfers "to anyone," controls exports of unscheduled chemicals. Parts VI-
VIII of the Verification Annex, which control exports of scheduled chemicals,
include equally broad terminology like "shall not transfer such chemicals outside
its territory," 94 and shall require the "name(s) and address(es) of the end-
user(s)." 95 As the latter language appears in the very provisions that indicate the
Convention's focus is on states, not private entities, and clearly connotes that
any transfer going out of the country is of concern, there is no reason to accept
the view that transfers to businesses or other private entities in another nation
fall outside the ambit of the CWC.
IV. Exports by Overseas Affiliates of Party-Based Enterprises
The preceding section concentrated on exports from a state party of controlled
chemicals produced there and shipped by either free-standing domestic enterprises
or by domestic affiliates of foreign enterprises. The present section directs atten-
tion to exports of toxic chemicals and their precursors by overseas affiliates of
enterprises located in parties to the Convention. Again, the exports of concern
are chemicals produced in the country in which the affiliate is located, not those
originating elsewhere.96 In order to avoid overlap with material already covered,
the focus here is not on controls of the country in which the affiliate is located,
but on controls of the country where the holding enterprise is located. Thus,
this section examines the extraterritorial reach the CWC envisions the holding
enterprise's state to have over the activities of that enterprise's affiliate.
The Convention contains three sets of language that speak very directly to the
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. All of these appear in article VII, which,
as seen above, obligates parties to adopt legislation guaranteeing that natural and
92. See, e.g., id., Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 1 (referencing transfers to "another
State Party"), pt. VII(C) para. 31 (referencing transfers "only ... to ... States Parties"), & pt.
VIII(C), para. 26 (referencing transfers to "States not Party" to the Convention).
93. Id. art. I, para. 1(a); see A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 419 n.10 (indicating that the
Convention's provisions with regard to Schedule 1 chemicals apply to natural or legal persons, not
just states); see also id. at 419 n. 13 (indicating the implication of universality in the term "anyone").
94. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(A), para. 1.
95. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 32(e) & pt. VIII(C), para. 26(e).
96. For discussion of the reexport problem as it relates to overseas affiliates, see infra part V.
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legal persons will not violate the terms of the Convention.97 The first set, in
paragraph 1 (a), provides for the adoption of domestic legislation prohibiting and
penalizing violations by natural and legal persons "on its territory or in any other
place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law." 98 The second
set, in paragraph l(b), provides for implementing legislation prohibiting viola-
tions "in any place under. . . [a party's] control.' 99 The third set, in paragraph
1(c), requires each party to extend its penal legislation to prohibit violations
of the Convention "undertaken anywhere" by "natural persons, possessing its
nationality, in conformity with international law."'00
Paragraph l(c) makes it clear that a national of a state party must be subjected
to the laws of the state of nationality, regardless of where that national is located.
For instance, if The Netherlands, a signatory, ratified the Convention through its
own domestic constitutional processes, it would be required to adopt implementing
legislation prohibiting its nationals, even though situated in another nation, party
or not, from engaging in activities, like exporting, outlawed under the CWC. °10
Such extraterritorial reach is confined to natural persons. Paragraph l(c) will not
support the view that hypothetical overseas affiliates of Netherlands-based enterprises
are subject to Netherlands export controls on toxic chemicals because the affiliates
are controlled through ownership, or otherwise, by Netherlands-based businesses.t2
97. See supra note 39.
98. CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1(a).
99. Id. para. l(b).
100. Id. para. 1(c).
101. A national of The Netherlands located in the territory of another party to the CWC would
also fall within the reach of laws that that other country must adopt in order to implement its
own obligations under the Convention. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. The language
of para. 2 of art. VII, which requires parties to cooperate with each other to facilitate implementa-
tion of the obligations in para. 1, can be seen as speaking to, among other things, the matter of
concurrent authority.
102. Under the U.S. Department of Commerce's export administration regulations, 15 C.F.R.
§ 770.1-. 15 (1995), overseas affiliates of U.S. entities have been subjected to export restrictions in
situations in which the U.S. entities are said to have control of the affiliate. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250,
27,251 (1982) (defining "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" as meaning foreign
businesses owned or controlled by some U.S. entity). This extension led Commerce to assert jurisdic-
tion over a French company, Dresser (France), concerning exports from France of gas compressors
built by the company in France. On the case and ensuing controversy with the European allies, see
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1982); Dresser Indus., Inc. v.
Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982); Dresser (France) S.A., Initial Decision of Hearing
Commissioner of Sept. 30, 1982, 18 U.S. Export Wkly. (BNA) 25 (1982); Dresser (France) S.A.,
Decision and Order of Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration of Nov. 1, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg.
51,463 (1982); Ordre de Requisition des Services, Aug. 23, 1982 (from the French Minister of
Research and Industry); Note, Comments of the European Community on the Amendments of 22
June 1982 to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations, COM(82)558 final (cited in ANDREAS
F. LOWENFELD. TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 295 n. f (1983)). For an identical controversy
between the United States and Europe under the U.S. Department of Treasury foreign asset control
regulations, see Judgment of May 22, 1965 (Soci6t6 Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy), Cours d'appel,
Paris, 2 D.S. Jur. 86 (Fr.). For insight concerning the intent of para. 1(c) of art. VII of the CWC,
see A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 115.
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Paragraph 1(a) stands at the other end of the spectrum from paragraph 1 (c)'s
nationality-based extraterritorial reach. 103 This second set of language in article
VII, fixing a requirement on parties to regulate conduct of private entities, is
essentially territorial in nature. It envisions a CWC party addressing activities
of private entities operating within the borders of that particular state.'°4 More-
over, its reference to legal and natural persons indicates, as alluded to earlier,
that the activities of business enterprises shall be regulated. 1 05 The difficulty in
relying on paragraph 1(a) to argue that parties shall prohibit and penalize violative
activities of overseas enterprises affiliated with entities located in the regulating
state is that the only basis for the argument resides in the paragraph's reference
to "any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law."16
This language surely speaks to situations in which an overseas affiliate (or, for
that matter, a wholly domestic enterprise or a domestic affiliate of a foreign
enterprise) engages in conduct, like prohibited transfers, on ships or aircraft
registered in the regulating state while such vessels are in international waters or
international airspace.'°7 It does not, however, suggest any obligation to regulate
transfers by such affiliates when occurring within the borders of another state,
whether a party to the Convention or not. 108 In this sense, then, paragraph l(a)
extends very little beyond what is provided by paragraph 1(c).
The third set of language of article VII, that contained in paragraph 1 (b), also
addresses situations in which parties must adopt legislation, and that language
may address the conduct of overseas affiliates.'°9 As just observed, overseas
affiliates do not fall within the extraterritorial legislation referenced in the context
of nationality, and they do not have to be subjected to legislation on a territorial
basis, except in those uncommon situations involving activities aboard registered
vessels located in international common areas. The language of paragraph l(b),
however, goes further and refers to parties being obligated to adopt implementing
legislation prohibiting violative conduct "in any place under ... [their] con-
103. See CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1(a).
104. Domestic affiliates of foreign business enterprises are regulated under this language. See
supra part III and accompanying notes.
105. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
106. CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1(a).
107. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 112-13. In the United States, during the 103d
Congress, the domestic legislation submitted to the Senate, simultaneous with the submission of the
CWC for advice and consent of that body, and the legislation submitted to the House of Representa-
tives, contained language suggesting this very point. See S. 2221, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5(b)(3),
201 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. ch. 11 with § 227D(8)). 140 CONG. REC. S7250, S7251 (daily
ed. June 21, 1994); H.R. 4849, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5(b)(3), 201 (1994). As of the time this
article was completed, the Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commmerce,
Washington, D.C., informed the author that the Clinton administration was in the process of preparing
new implementing legislation that would differ in some respects from the earlier proposals.
108. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 113-14 (indicating that overseas affiliates of a
domestic enterprise shall be reached if such affiliates are branches of the parent enterprise, that is,
entities not separately organized under the laws of the overseas states in which they operate).
109. See CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 1(b).
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trol. '" ° Looked at against the backdrop of paragraph l(a), the reference to
areas under a party's control touches on a couple of situations. First, it requires
extraterritorial legislation to deal with cases in which some private entity, such
as an overseas affiliate, engages in violative activity, like prohibited transfers,
from an overseas location that the nation of the affiliate's holding enterprise
may have under its control. Examples would include foreign territory under the
military authority of the holding enterprise's state, as well as areas beyond the
national boundaries of any state where the holding enterprise's state exercises
authority. "'
Significantly more troublesome, however, is the second situation. That situa-
tion would involve an overseas affiliate's conduct within a state not a party to
the Convention, or within a state party that, we might assume, is delinquent in
fulfilling its obligation to prohibit something like violative export activity. The
problem is that the idea of control does not imply that it is enough that the
state of the enterprise that holds the overseas affiliate have a desire, interest, or
willingness to step into the void created by the affiliate locating in a nonparty, 2
or in a party remiss in implementing its obligations. The CWC does not envision
the mere fact that one state exercises its discretion not to become an adherent
to the Convention, or fails to administer its terms in a manner thought satisfactory
to another, as requiring, or justifying, extraterritorial reach. Where control over
a place exists, an overseas affiliate can and must be regulated. But even in such
cases, the regulation springs from control's linkage to the territorial basis of
jurisdiction. Given the fact that paragraph l(c) confines jurisdiction based on
nationality to natural persons alone, the regulation cannot be understood as spring-
ing from the affiliate's taking on the nationality of the holding enterprise itself."3
V. The Reexport Problem
The two preceding sections of this commentary focus on exports of toxic
chemicals and their precursors produced in the country of the business enterprise
involved in the exportation. Whether the concern has been regulation by a state
party of transfers made by private entities located therein (free-standing domestic
110. Id.
111. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 115-16. The idea of control is plainly open to
numerous interpretations and potentially capable of generating much controversy.
112. See id. at 114 (indicating with regard to para. 1(a) of art. VII that "neither the respective
State Party nor the parent company could reasonably be expected to enforce legally a prohibition
in the subsidiary in case its management continues collaboration with the government of the State,
not Party, in which it is located. "); see also David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms:
Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 68 (1990)
(suggesting that the then draft Convention should not require states parties to exercise jurisdiction
over affiliates of enterprises located within their own borders, when those affiliates locate overseas
in a state not party to the CWC).
113. For examples of instances in which regulatory provisions of U.S. law have seemed to impute
U.S. nationality to overseas affiliates of U.S. companies, see supra note 102.
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businesses, or domestic affiliates of foreign enterprises) or has been extraterrito-
rial regulation of overseas affiliates (entities operating in a country other than
the regulating state where the enterprise that holds the affiliate is located), discus-
sion has been based on the assumption that the chemicals transferred were pro-
duced in the country where the regulated enterprise was located. This section
now briefly examines the situation where the regulated enterprise has received
the chemicals of concern by way of import, and then wishes to make a transfer
of those same chemicals outside the country. 14 The discussion concentrates not
on regulation by the country of the entity that receives the import, but on regulation
by the country from which the import was initially shipped-another wrinkle in
the idea of extraterritoriality." 5 Regulation by the country of the importer who
wishes to export what was imported is left aside because every state party to the
CWC, as has already been pointed out, 1 6 must adopt legislation prohibiting and
penalizing violative conduct occurring within its borders.
With regard to extraterritorial regulation by the country that has supplied an
import to an enterprise located elsewhere, from the vantage of the Convention
states parties have a real interest in regulation. Not only is it unlikely that many
nonparties would have an interest in extraterritorial regulation of reexports by
recipients in other countries, the Convention itself, in speaking to reexports and
114. Obviously, since the limitations on reexport called for in the Convention (see supra notes
67 (Schedule 1 chemicals), 74 (Schedule 2 chemicals), 82 (Schedule 3 chemicals)) speak to the
original exporting nation, if that nation is not a party to the CWC, those limitations are meaningless.
As a consequence, the reexport problem examined below considers the interest in reexporting to
have come from a state party to the Convention. While we speak of reexport, the proper term used
in the CWC is retransfer. The concept of retransfer would seem broad enough to cover not only
reexports, but transfers from the original importer to another business entity that may be located in
the initial importing state-in other words, an intrastate, as opposed to an interstate, transfer. See
A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 13, 419 (indicating that the concept of transfer in article I includes
intrastate transfers between entities, but referencing only interstate transfers in the context of the
concept of retransfer).
115. To state it in terms of particular countries, if controlled chemicals were imported from the
United States by an enterprise in Germany, this section's focus would be on U.S. regulation of the
German recipient's interest in a later export of the imported chemical, a reexport, to a third country.
One may think that such U.S. regulation might be based on the mere fact that the exported chemical
came from a supplier in the United States. In the past, assertions of regulatory authority under the
U.S. export administration regime have been based on such facts. See, e.g., Bay Laboratories Ltd.
and Byron Williams, Order Denying Export Privileges for an Indefinite Period, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,147
(1968) (imposing sanctions upon Irish defendants located abroad for reexporting, in violation of the
export administration regulations, controlled items received from the United States). On this theory,
extraterritorial reach could apply even to wholly independent and unaffiliated entities located overseas.
See SNAM Progetti, S.p.A, Consent Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 2,460 (1970) (unaffiliated Italian company
that received technology exported from the United States in compliance with export administration
regulations charged with violating such after reexporting to prohibited third-country destination). In
the event of any extraterritorial application of a regulatory regime, the obvious question is how
sanctions for violative conduct are to be made effective. The United States, in the context of the
export administration regulations, has attempted to prevent future U.S. exports from being made to
overseas violators. See the two cases cited above.
116. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to regulate activities
within one's territory, or in areas under one's jurisdiction).
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regulation by the initial supplying state, only deals with states parties. Thus,
much of the reexport problem can be broken down according to the nature of
the chemicals involved and the state to which the initial transfer is made.
Preliminarily, the CWC differentiates between scheduled and unscheduled
chemicals. For all scheduled chemicals, the Convention contains language indicat-
ing that once supplied to an importer in another country, retransfers are unaccept-
able. The language simply provides that Schedule 1 "[c]hemicals transferred
shall not be retransferred to a third State."" ' 7 Concerning Schedule 2 and 3
chemicals, the language provides that the transferring state party "shall require
from the recipient State" a certificate declaring the chemicals "will not be re-
transferred.""18 Transfers of unscheduled chemicals, however, are addressed in
the articles of the Convention itself, not in the Verification Annex dealing with
scheduled chemicals. Consistent with the idea of providing for little beyond
limiting the purposes for which transfers of unscheduled chemicals may take
place, " 9 nothing appears to suggest that the CWC controls reexports of unsched-
uled chemicals once they are supplied to an importer in another state.
The significance of this differentiation between scheduled and unscheduled
chemicals is overlaid with another complexity. As alluded to earlier, the CWC pro-
hibits supplying Schedule 1 chemicals to states not party to the Convention;
20
Schedule 2 chemicals fall under an identical prohibition three years after entry into
force."'2 Chemicals listed in Schedule 3,122 and all unscheduled toxic chemicals and
their precursors, may be transferred to importers in any other country. 123 With the
exception of the situation involving Schedule 2 chemicals transferred during the
three-year interim period following the entry into force of the CWC, the matter of
extraterritorial assertions by a state supplying an initial import of a Schedule 1 or
2 chemical that the importer now wishes to reexport will likely arise only when
the supplying and the importing/reexporting states are parties to the Convention.
Again, the Convention prohibits transfers to nonparties. On the other hand, as for
Schedule 3 and unscheduled chemicals, as well as for Schedule 2 chemicals during
the interim period, claims to extraterritorial regulation may arise with regard to
initial transfers made to states parties or nonparties. Nothing in the Convention
confines transfers of such to parties alone.
Accordingly, in instances of extraterritoriality on the basis of a Schedule 1 or
a Schedule 2 (post-interim period) chemical's country of supply, both of the
countries involved will be states parties. Transfers by a supplying state cannot
be made to a nonparty. In the event the initial importing state party is delinquent
117. CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(B), para. 4.
118. Id., Verification Annex, pt. VII(C), para. 32(b), & pt. VIII(C), para. 26(b).
119. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 63.
121. See supra note 71.
122. See supra note 79.
123. See supra note 89.
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in fulfilling its obligation regarding restrictions on reexports, tensions may surface
as the supplying state manifests its concern. There seems no reason, however,
to read the relevant provisions of the Convention as mandating any assertion of
extraterritorial reach by the supplying state. The Convention merely speaks of
retransfers being prohibited. 14 It does not suggest that delinquency by the im-
porting state in meeting its responsibility requires, or empowers, the supplying
state to act. From the previous discussion of article VII's extension of the CWC's
prohibitions to natural and legal persons, as well as to areas under jurisdiction
or control, such power may be found to exist. 125 To be sure, it would exist not by
virtue of the chemicals having been supplied by the state asserting extraterritorial
legislative reach, 26 but by virtue of jurisdiction over a natural person based on
nationality, or over a legal or natural person based on some notion of conduct
occurring in a place under the jurisdiction or control of the asserting state. In
either of these instances, the extraterritoriality called for by the CWC would
be tremendously confined and available in only the most unusual of business
circumstances. 27
When it comes to Schedule 3 and unscheduled chemicals, as well as Sched-
ule 2 chemicals during the interim period prior to the time the obligation not
124. See CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(B), para. 4, & pt. VII(C), paras. 31-32.
In the case of pt. VII(C), paras. 31-32, there is no explicit language like in pt. VI(B), para. 4, which
plainly states no retransfers. Nonetheless, one may reasonably infer that if Schedule 1 chemicals
may not be transferred to nonparties (and once transferred to a party cannot be retransferred), and
that if Schedule 2 chemicals may not be transferred to nonparties after the three-year interim period,
then the parties initially importing such chemicals may not retransfer them. In the United States'
proposed implementing legislation, sent forward during, but not acted upon by, the 103d Congress,
the United States did not assert authority to deal with the matter of reexports of chemicals initially
imported by another state from stocks located in the United States. See, e.g., S. 2221, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 203 (1994).
125. See supra part IV and accompanying notes.
126. The language of the Convention setting out the obligations about retransfers of Schedule 1
and 2 chemicals does not seem to establish powers in the initial supplying state. The language merely
focuses on erecting prohibitions on retransfers, or on requiring certifications that such transfers will
not occur.
127. In the context of a private, individual entrepreneur operating in, say, Great Britain and
Belgium, the nationality basis would clearly allow the person's state of nationality, Great Britain,
to assert jurisdiction to prohibit that person from exporting Schedule 1 or 2 (post-interim period)
chemicals to Belgium, and from then later attempting to reexport them from Belgium to another
destination. The Convention obligates Belgium to regulate exports of such chemicals, but also requires
Great Britain to regulate the conduct of its own nationals, wherever located. In the context of an
overseas Belgian affiliate of a British entity, the import by the affiliate of the same chemicals places
Belgium in the position of having to assure no reexport. In the inconceivable event of Belgium failing
to live up to its obligation regarding reexports, Great Britain would be hard pressed to cite language
in art. VII of the CWC requiring it to prohibit the affiliate from engaging in reexporting. The only
possible terminology available would be that concerning places under jurisdiction or control. See
CWC, supra note 1, art. VII, para. l(a)-(b). The number of occasions when such language will in
fact support the contention that the Convention requires extraterritorial legislative reach over an
affiliate are indeed extremely few. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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to ship such to nonparties becomes effective, the matter of extraterritorial
reach may arise in connection with reexports that a business in a state party,
or in a state not a party, to the CWC may be interested in making. After all,
the Convention does not limit initial supplying states to transfers to importing
entities in states parties. Thus, initial importing entities may be located in
states that are parties to the CWC, or in countries that have not agreed to be
bound by the Convention's terms. 28
The place to begin in understanding the Convention's approach to extraterrito-
rial reach on reexports of Schedule 3 and unscheduled chemicals, as well as
Schedule 2 (interim period) chemicals, is with the straightforward matter of
unscheduled chemicals. Transfers of unscheduled chemicals carry no burden
regarding reexport. 129 If unscheduled chemicals are initially supplied to an im-
porter in another state party, the CWC does not restrict that importer's right to
retransfer those chemicals to an entity in a third state. The absence of retransfer
language regarding unscheduled chemicals weakens claims that the Convention
recognizes extraterritoriality by the supplying state. 13° Any support in the CWC
therefore must reside in the general prescriptions of article VII. 131 If a nationality
connection with a initial importer who is a natural person can be shown, then a
basis for supplying state regulation exists.1 32 If it can be shown that the place
from which the initial importer conducts its operations is under the jurisdiction
128. Therefore, once initial importing entities within either a state party or a state not a party to
the Convention receive the Schedule 3 or unscheduled chemicals, or interim period Schedule 2
chemicals, they may wish to reexport to entities located in other states, including those not signing
the CWC. This section of the article proceeds by first focusing on unscheduled chemicals; then
taking up Schedule 2 (interim period) and Schedule 3 chemicals initially imported by entities within
states parties to the Convention; and finally addressing Schedule 2 (interim period) and Schedule 3
chemicals initially imported by entities in nonparties.
129. See supra text accompanying note 119.
130. The language relating to retransfers of Schedule 3 chemicals and to Schedule 2 (interim
period) chemicals is associated with that concerning retransfers of Schedule 1 chemicals. That is,
it speaks of no retransfers, or requires some sort of certification stating that there will be no retransfers.
This language far from indicates that a supplying state may assert extraterritorial reach over reexports
by initial importers. See supra text accompanying note 124 (discussing Schedule 1 and post-interim
period Schedule 2 chemicals). Nevertheless, some may argue that such language implies Convention
permissibility of extraterritoriality on the basis that the state asserting such reach supplied the con-
cerned chemical. With unscheduled chemicals, however, the fact that the CWC contains absolutely
no language relating to restrictions on retransfers suggests that any assertion by a supplying state
to extraterritorial reach on the basis of having supplied the chemical is largely without merit.
131. See supra part IV.
132. As indicated supra note 127, a case of this sort could arise if an individual citizen of, say,
the United States were to ship an unscheduled chemical to Japan, listing himself or herself. Though
the Convention would not speak to the matter of that person reexporting the chemical to, for example,
North Korea-a nonparty-it does contain language providing the United States can assert jurisdiction
over its nationals, wherever located. Consequently, in the extremely remote case of Japanese delin-
quency in stopping transfers to North Korea for prohibited, nonpeaceful purposes, support exists in
the CWC for assertion of jurisdiction by the United States.
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or control of the supplying state, then extraterritorial regulation can be asserted. 133
Cases of this sort are unlikely to arise with any degree of regularity.
134
Schedule 3 chemicals, and Schedule 2 (interim period) chemicals, do carry a
retransfer burden.1 35 A certification that the chemicals will not be reexported
must be obtained in connection with an initial import by an entity within a state
not a party to the Convention.1 36 In the event that the initial import is made by
an entity within a state that is a party, no such certification need be secured. 1
37
From this differentiation, initial imports by entities within states parties to the
CWC may result in two adherents to the Convention being placed in positions
of disagreement. The supplying state may want the state party where the initial
importing entity is located to be more diligent in administering the Convention's
restriction on retransfers. And, in the event the state where the initial importing
entity is located is slow to act, the supplying state may seek to identify the CWC's
legal bases said to justify extraterritorial action of its own. Again, however, the
retransfer restrictions of the Convention no more appear to set forth a basis for
contending that the supplying country of a Schedule 3 chemical, or a Schedule
2 chemical shipped during the interim period, may assert an extraterritorial reach
over reexports, than those restrictions set forth a basis for such an assertion
with regard to a Schedule 1 chemical.138 Nonetheless, in a few highly unusual
situations, supplying state extraterritorial reach to regulate reexports may be
found to exist on the basis of article VII.
139
133. For example, a case involving a retransfer from a place under supplying state jurisdiction
would be one in which an unscheduled chemical is shipped out of Italy aboard an Italian registered
flag ship destined for Egypt, both states being signatories to the CWC. While in the Mediterranean,
the chemicals are transferred to the possession of a representative of a business entity located in
Libya, a nonsignatory, known to want the chemicals for prohibited purposes. Given the registry of
the Italian vessel, Italy would be in a position of asserting extraterritorial reach. It would not matter
that the business entity making the transfer to the Libyan entity was a legal, rather than natural,
person, as Italy's authority would be based on the concept of a place under its jurisdiction, not upon
nationality, as importer on the other end.
134. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing extraterritorial reach in the context
of Schedule 1 and 2 (post-interim period) chemicals).
135. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
136. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 445 (indicating that, with nonparties, bilateral
agreements may have to be negotiated).
137. See CWC, supra note 1, Verification Annex, pt. VI(C), paras. 31-32, & pt. VIII(C), para.
26.
138. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (making this same point with regard to
Schedules 1 and 2 (post-interim period) chemicals); see also supra note 130 (retransfer language of
the Convention does not support claims to extraterritoriality by supplying state in context of scheduled
or unscheduled chemicals).
139. See supra notes 124-27, 132-33 and accompanying text. The situations cited and discussed
in notes 124-27 involve insufficient enforcement by a state party of the retransfer obligations relative
to Schedules 1 and 2 (post-interim period) chemicals, with the supplying state wishing to assert
extraterritorial reach over the entity involved in the retransfer. Those situations cited and discussed
in notes 132-33 involve unscheduled chemicals, which have no comparable retransfer obligation,
and delinquency by a state party in assuring that transfers from its territory are for nonprohibited
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Entities within states not party to the CWC who import Schedule 3 or unsched-
uled chemicals, as well as Schedule 2 (interim period) chemicals, operate free
of the Convention's restrictions on reexport. 14o The states in which such business
entities are located have not committed themselves to the terms of the CWC.
Even in the case of imports of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals, all that such states
have given is a certification that retransfers will not occur. When it comes to
unscheduled chemicals, such states have not given even the barest form of commit-
ment about retransfers. Since in these situations a supplying state is involved
with a state not a party to the Convention, the terms of article VII would seem
inapplicable in resolving matters of extraterritorial reach. That article fixes ex-
plicit obligations on states parties to adopt implementing internal legislation de-
signed to assure observance of the prohibitions of the CWC. In a sense, though,
it also establishes the parameters of what the Convention considers acceptable
regulatory reach. As any consensual commitment, however, it only provides a
basis for a party to argue that another party must respect the limits established.
Claims by a nonparty that a supplying state that is party to the Convention has
exceeded what the CWC considers acceptable would not fall on receptive ears.
The principles of international law establish the limits of each state's legislative
jurisdiction, 14' but the limits articulated in article VII of the Convention would
purposes (e.g., for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful
purposes), with the supplying state then asserting extraterritorial reach over the retransfer. In all
these cases, the idea of basing such reach on having supplied the chemical that is, or is about to be,
retransferred is rejected. From the perspective of the CWC, such reach shall be based on nationality
over natural persons, or on a prohibited act occurring in a place under the asserting state's jurisdiction
or control. In connection with Schedule 3 chemicals, or interim period Schedule 2 chemicals, another
illustration might be added. Specifically, assume that a French company ships such chemicals to a
wholly independent and unaffiliated importer in New York City. The appropriate certifications on
retransfer are given, but the importer, a Pakistani employed by the French Government to work in
its Office of U.N. Affairs in New York, subsequently prepares to reexport the chemicals to a purchaser
in Canada. The Pakistani has operated the chemical sales business out of France's U.N. Office. In
the remote case of the United States not fulfilling its obligation to prevent the reexport, the French
would be hard pressed to find authority in the Convention to support an assertion of extraterritorial
reach, outside the idea that the location of its Office of U.N. Affairs is a place under its control or
jurisdiction.
140. As we have already seen, the CWC contains no language restricting retransfers of unscheduled
chemicals. See supra text accompanying note 128. Therefore, one could never argue that imports
into one country, whether or not a party to the Convention, could not be reexported to another. As
for Schedule 3 chemicals and Schedule 2 (interim period) chemicals, a retransfer obligation exists,
but, as noted below, that obligation has no effect on nonparties.
141. On the general matter of international law's limits on legislative jurisdiction, see A.V. Lowe,
Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A
Reply to A. V. Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1981); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 579 (1983); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § § 402-403 (1986) & comments and reporiers'
notes.
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Whether the Chemical Weapons Convention will receive ratification from the
necessary sixty-five states needed to bring it into force remains to be seen.
1 4 1
The growing number of states capable of developing toxic chemicals for weapons
use, and the collapse of the former Soviet empire certainly suggest that the chances
of this happening are much better today than they were a decade ago. Without
intimating any opinion about the propriety of the terms of the Convention from
the business standpoint, it establishes significant obligations concerning various
matters, including both declarations regarding chemical production facilities and
access rights to industries for purposes of conducting verification inspections.
Those knowledgeable about the Convention have centered most of their attention
on these obligations. The controls that the CWC envisions over exports of toxic
chemicals and their precursors have not received comparable scrutiny. While
this article attempts to provide brief insight into that matter, how those controls
are finally configured in each state party will depend as much on what the relevant
implementing domestic legislation and regulations say as on the controls envi-
sioned by the Convention itself.
142. To claim the rights incident to art. VII's limitations on extraterritorial reach, one must have
undertaken the obligations of the Convention invoked. As a state not party to the CWC has not taken
on such obligations, it would be unable to invoke its rights.
143. At the time that this article was completed, Nancy Crowe, Office of Exporter Services,
Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., had informed
the author that 25-30 states had ratified the Convention. However, the necessary 65 ratifications
probably would not be secured until both the United States and Russia had acted.
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